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RECENT DECISIONS
Although the distinction between a clear and a possible chance
would appear to be one readily perceived, the courts apparently have
not always borne it in mind.15 In the instant case, since the defen-
dant had only two seconds in which to avert a collision, it is ap-
parent that his opportunity of averting the injury could only be
classified as a mere possibility. Since the defendant is only required
to exercise reasonable care in averting the consequences of the plain-
tiff's negligence he cannot be regarded as negligent in failing to
realize such a possibility. To hold otherwise would, under the guise
of the doctrine of last clear chance, abrogate the rule of contributory
negligence.
J. P. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJuRY ARISING OUT OF AND
IN THE COURSE OF THE EmPLOYMENT-HORSEPLAY AND PRACTICAL
JoKING.-This proceeding was instituted under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws 1 by the widow of the deceased, a trucker in the em-
ploy of defendant, for an award of disability compensation and death
benefits. Decedent's death was caused by his having drunk from a
bottle labeled whiskey, but which contained a poison. The occur-
rence took place in the maintenance room of the employer's plant,
during the decedent's working hours, on New Year's Eve. The evi-
dence shows that general drinking from open view liquor bottles
throughout the plant was customary at that time of the year because
of the approaching New Year holiday. The evidence further indi-
cated that the fatal episode was caused by decedent having been made
the "butt of a joke" by his fellow employees. Held, for claimant.
Decedent's death was due to "injuries from an accident which arose
out of and in the course of his employment." McCarthy v. Rem-
ington Rand, Inc., - App. Div. -, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 456 (3d Dep't
1949).
who then applied the air brakes, but not in time to avert the injury. The
plaintiff attempted to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance contending that,
had the fireman jumped across the cab and applied the brakes himself, seconds
would have been saved and the injury averted. The court held that the fire-
man's failure to apply the brakes was at most an error in judgment in an
emergency for which the defendant could not be held liable).
15 See Nielsen v. Richman, 68 S. D. 104, 299 N. W. 74, 76 (1941) (dis-
senting opinion); Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S. E. 53, 59 (1931)
(dissenting opinion).
IN. Y. WoRxmEN's COmPENSAION LAW § 10, which requires every em-
ployer subject to the chapter to pay or provide compensation to his employees
for their disability or death "arising out of and in the course of" their em-
ployment. This compensation is awarded without regard as to fault, except
when the injury is caused wilfully or solely by intoxication.
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At common law the duty of an employer to protect his servants
was limited to certain specific minimum obligations, beyond which
the servant was expected to assume all the risks of his employment.
2
The employer was not an insurer of safety, and he was not respon-
sible for injuries caused solely by the negligence of fellow servants,
as distinguished from the employer's own misconduct.3 However,
with humane changes in the social philosophy early in the twentieth
century, the Workmen's Compensation Laws were created upon the
theory of strict liability of the employer for injuries attributed to the
risks of the employment.4 In the main, in order that compensation
be awarded under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, it
is necessary only that the employee's injury arise "out of and in the
course of the employment." 5 The provision is a dual one and both
requirements must be met; neither alone is sufficient.8
The workman is considered to be in the course of his employ-
ment when he is doing an act which he was employed to perform or
is reasonably incidental to it.7 Arising out of the employment means
substantially that the injury arises out of conditions or hazards pecu-
liar to the employment, as distinct from the general hazards of life.8
It is not necessary that the risk be a foreseeable one against which
a reasonable man would take precautions, since liability is not based
on negligence.9
Although injuries sustained through horseplay which was done
independently from the performance of any duty of the employment, °
or in which the injured employee participated," were once considered
2 PRosSEa, ToRTs § 67 (1941).
3 The fellow servant rule appeared first in England in the case of Priestly
v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). It was adopted by
the American courts in the case of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry., 4 Metc.
49 (Mass. 1849).
4Laws of N. Y. 1914, c. 41.
5 N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 2(7), 10. The ever-increasing
liberalness of the New York courts in interpreting this clause over the past
thirty years is strikingly portrayed when the decision in the instant case is
compared with the case of De Salvio v. Menihan Co., 225 N. Y. 123, 121 N. E.
766 (1919), where the claimant, having left his bench to shake hands with a
fellow workman who had been drafted, injured his hand in a machine and
was denied recovery as having left the course of his employment when the
injury occurred.
6 Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 151, 152, 112 N. E. 750, 751 (1916).
7 Brown, "Arising Out Of and In the Course of the Employment" in
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 7 Wis. L. REv. 15, 24 (1931), paraphrasing
MEcHEm, AGENCY 1461 (2d ed. 1914).
s Brown, "Arising Oitt Of and It the Course of the Employment" in
Workmen's Compensation Acts 8 Wis. L. REv. 134, 135 (1933), citing Mueller
Construction Co. v. Industrial bd., 283 Ili. 148, 118 N. E. 1028 (1918).
9 See note 1 supra.
10 See Note, 13 A. L. R. 540 (1921).
Ux Guarin v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 298 N. Y. 511, 80 N. E. 2d 660 (1948);
Stillwagon v. Callan Bros., 224 N. Y. 714, 121 N. E. 893 (1918); De Filippis
v Falkenberg, 219 N. Y. 581, 114 N. E. 1064 (1916) ; cf. De Salvio v. Meni-
han Co., 225 N. Y. 123, 121 N. E. 766 (1919).
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to have been outside the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Laws,
the courts have recognized exceptions. Compensation has been
granted where an employee, injured by the horseplay of others, took
no part in the fooling, but was attending to his duties at the time.12
Moreover, some courts have taken the notably human view that cer-
tain kinds of foolery are normally to be expected when workmen are
gathered together, and that the risk of injury from such horseplay
is to be attributed to the work itself. "The risks of injury incurred
in the crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of fellow-
workmen are not measured by the tendency of such acts to serve the
master's business." 13 This latter exception is further amplified in
the case of Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy,1 4 where the New York
Court of Appeals expressed its opinion that if certain acts of foolery
were customary or usual, they become, part and parcel, an incident
of the employment; the court concluding that an employee par-
ticipating therein is not separated from his employment, and in-
juries suffered thereby are compensable injuries arising out of the
employment.
In considering the problem presented in the instant case, the
court continued to apply the established liberal views. Taking into
account that the pre-holiday spirit of festivity was bound to pervade
the entire factory life as a natural incident of the employment, and
that general drinking throughout the plant was customary at that
time of the year, the court reasoned that since the risk of injury
raised by the open view presence of the whiskey bottle containing
poison had been brought about by authorized and other incidental
rather than unauthorized conduct of defendant's employees, that
therefore decedent, in the course of his employment, encountered a
risk, which arose out of it.
S. E. A.
12 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920) ;
Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern & Son, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126 (1920);
Markell v. Daniel Green Felt Shoe Co., 221 N. Y. 493, 116 N. E. 1060 (1917);
Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152 (1918) ; Pekin
Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Bd., 227 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128 (1917); Knopp v.
American Car Foundry, 186 Ill. App. 605 (1914).
13 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 472, 473, 128 N. E.
711, 712 (1920).
24 295 N. Y. 443, 68 N. E. 2d 434 (1946).
1949 ]
